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This study uses the nationally representative Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to
identify systematic differences in earnings returns to human capital endowments for
formal and informal sector workers in rural and urban Mexico. Returns to experience
are critical in explaining the large urban wage gap in a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
and indeed drive pull migration from the rural informal sector to the urban informal
sector, exacerbating urban population congestion in already over-crowded main cities.
Targeted rural industrial planning is essential to offset pull migration and ensure a more
balanced urban/rural development through incentives.
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Large wage gaps exist between rural and urban workers in all developing countries in
the world (Mazumdar, 1987; Young, 2013). At the same time, we observe high urban
unemployment, large informal sectors and criminal activity in urban centers of devel-
oping countries. Rural-to-urban migration continues, because of striving for a more
prosperous life in the cities. Whether migrants succeed is a question of many factors,
such as networks (Boyd, 1989; Klabunde, 2014), personality traits (Stark & Taylor,
1991), and human capital (Boucher et al. 2005; Gould, 2007; Glaeser & Maré, 2001).
All of these factors contribute to higher probabilities of employment, but what is the
extent to which these factors can explain rural–urban wage inequality, i.e. whether
rural-to-urban migrants possess these characteristics to a larger extent than those who
do not migrate? To gain insight into this question through use of indicators for the for-
mal/informal sector, this study analyses the urban earnings potential of low educated
workers from rural Mexico.
Mexico has seen dramatic increases in its urban population. Notably, Mexico hosts the
largest city in the world, and the country’s urban population grew from 66% to 76% be-
tween 1980 and 2005 (WorldBank, 2010). This development is illustrated in Fig. 1, which
depicts the decrease of the rural population from 29% to 22% between 1990 and 2010
and an increase in population density in four of Mexico’s ten largest cities; Mexico City,
Guadalajara, Puebla and Monterrey. All four cities show a similar development of an in-
crease in population of about 25% within 20 years.2015 Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Fig. 1 Urbanisation. Source: The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico), OECD
Metropolitan database (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx). Author’s construction
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also for firms which provide employment – and require skilled and reliable workers. Both
domestic and international firms are more likely to settle in cities, or the periphery of a
large city, where skilled workers are abundant. These firms tend to pay higher wages than
rural, often less productive, firms (Gong & van Soest, 2002; Bosch & Maloney, 2007; Levy,
2008). For individuals from Mexico’s rural areas, of which approximately 50% lives in pov-
erty,1 the prospect of earning relatively higher wages or even simply being employed per
se is a pull-factor for migration to the cities. Moreover, as Lucas (2004) points out, the po-
tential to increase human capital in the form of experience is an important driver for
rural-to-urban migration, since the accumulation of human capital will increase future
earnings prospects (Becker, 1964).
Traditional theories of rural-to-urban migration predict that rural-to-urban migrants,
who do not find employment with a salary that exceeds their reservation wage, simply
return home (Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). In practice however, many rural-
to-urban migrants remain, even when unsuccessful in the labour market. As a conse-
quence, levels of unemployment rise further, and/or individuals work in the informal
segment of the labour market. In fact, the share of individuals working informally, and
the share of formally registered unemployed individuals exhibit very similar trends, as
Fig. 2 shows for the period 2000 to 2006.
These macroeconomic indicators suggest that the increase in rural-to-urban migra-
tion, rising urban population density, high unemployment and a large informal sector
share are highly correlated. Mexico also faces increasing levels in inequality, and crime
and violence. The latter phenomena occur disproportionately often in the cities. Under-
standing why individuals continue to migrate, is hence of pressing importance for
already densely populated urban areas.
We contribute to the explanations of the driving forces of rural-to-urban migra-
tion by investigating the differences in wages between rural and urban areas in
Mexico. Focusing on the argument that rural-to-urban migration is induced by the
Fig. 2 Unemployment and Informal Sector Shares. Source: INEGI (http://www.inegi.org.mx/).
Author’s construction
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perience, the analysis proceeds by estimating the returns to education, work experi-
ence and ability for rural and urban salaried workers separately. Thereby we take
into account differences in formal and informal employment characteristics. By as-
certaining the extent to which the differences in returns to human capital endow-
ments can explain the rural–urban wage differential, we can identify the economic
incentives of rural workers to migrate.
Using the detailed and nationally representative Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS,
or “ENNVIH” in Spanish), this study investigates wage differentials between rural and
urban areas in Mexico, further disaggregating by the formal and informal sector. Before
the availability of the MxFLS, previous studies on wage gaps between different types of
workers in Mexico were restricted to urban areas as representative data on the whole
population were not available before the publication of the MxFLS.2 This study uses
the second MxFLS wave which consists of data collected in the second half of 2005
and early 2006. Using this dataset, even though it enables only a cross-sectional analysis,
has two advantages: one conceptual and the other methodological. Firstly, Mexico’s labour
market is significantly distorted because of the skyrocketing levels of drug-related violence
observable since 2007.3 Hence, using 2005 data allows us to focus on the labour market
without needing to consider indicators for violence. Second, the household survey data
are of exceptional quality for the research question at hand, providing valuable informa-
tion on personality traits, such as risk preferences and honesty, which enables us to con-
trol for different sources of selection that may otherwise bias the regression estimates.
We find, as expected, large and significant urban wage premia in both formal and in-
formal sectors. Subsequently, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results show that in both
formal and informal sectors, the rural–urban wage differential is explained by differ-
ences in levels of human capital endowment; education, experience and cognitive abil-
ity. In the informal sector, the unexplained part of the wage differential is solely driven
by differences in returns to experience, whereas in the formal sector, no differences in
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urban informal market is very attractive for low-skilled, highly experienced workers.
Taking the findings by Maloney (1998, 1999, 2004) into consideration that in Mexico,
informal labour is by its nature voluntary, rather than used to queue for formal employ-
ment (as in most other countries), the findings suggest that rural-to-urban migration
will continue as long as the possibility of informal labour in urban Mexico persists. We
will discuss the need for policies which address the incentives for formal employment
both in urban and rural Mexico.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the existing litera-
ture on rural–urban wage differentials and migration incentives. In Section 3, we de-
scribe the empirical strategy to identify wage differentials and account for potential
selection bias. In Section 4, the data is explained and descriptive statistics are provided.
Section 5 outlines the main findings, and Section 6 provides a discussion followed by
the conclusions.2. Literature review
Theories of economic development postulate that rural-to-urban migration is the driv-
ing force of a developing country’s economic development. Following (Todaro, 1969)
and (Harris & Todaro, 1970) individuals migrate from rural to urban areas to find bet-
ter paid employment, rarely available in rural areas. Their theories postulate that mi-
grants who do not find a job with rewards exceeding their reservation wage will remain
unemployed, or simply return. In these models, the unemployment rate acts as the
driving force in determining the migration equilibrium. In his extension of the models
(Lucas, 2004) argues that high urban wages are attributed to high skills, which are not
accessible to low-skilled immigrants. In his model, individuals migrate to the cities to
accumulate work experience as a form of human capital formation. Following standard
human capital theory (Becker, 1964), labour market experience will increase future
earnings. Thus, the two main economic incentives to migrate are relatively high wages
and the promise of accumulating human capital.
Newer models of migration also include social factors such as previous migration ex-
perience, networks and inequalities in the migration decision. One factor that has re-
ceived much attention in recent years is relative deprivation, i.e. the perception of an
individual or household to be “worse off” or “disadvantaged” compared to a particular
reference group, for example, other families in the same village (Quinn, 2006; Stark &
Taylor, 1989; Stark & Taylor, 1991). Quinn (2006) uses the data from the Mexican Mi-
gration Project (MMP) for the year 2004 and finds that relative deprivation explains
part of the migration decision for internal migrants but not for those who migrate to
the United States. Klabunde (2014), based on a sophisticated agent-based model using
MMP data, shows that network ties are an important factor explaining both migration
from Mexico to the U.S. and return migration. Lastly and equally important, Gould
(2007) argues that working in a city increases workers’ productivity (see also: Glaeser &
Maré, 2001). Based on data of the U.S., he finds that white-collar workers receive a
wage premium in rural areas if they attained work experience in an urban area, whereas
blue collar workers’ urban work experience is not rewarded more than rural experience.
Hence, the incentive to accumulate human capital in the city is likely to play an
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on the sector of occupation.
In Mexico, increasing urbanisation has led to economic and social problems such as
increasing under-employment and high crime rates. Furthermore, wage inequality has
increased as more productive and human capital intensive firms settled in the cities
and paid higher wages than rural, often less productive, firms (Gong & van Soest, 2002;
Bosch & Maloney, 2007; Levy, 2008). That these higher wages exist, even after control-
ling for components of human capital endowment, costs of living and other character-
istics is shown by, e.g., Glaeser & Maré (2001) for the U.S.
When investigating rural–urban wage differentials in Mexico, it is essential to take
into account that the labour market is further divided into formal and informal employ-
ment. In fact, many authors do not focus on rural–urban wage differentials but on dif-
ferences between formal and informal wages. Early theories by Lewis (1954) and Fields
(1975) suggest that the informal sector is the disadvantaged segment of a dual labour
market in which workers are not protected by social security regulations and are in
weak bargaining positions with their employers. Despite the apparent disadvantages, in
the last decades, some developing countries have seen an increasing informal sector.
This has generated interest among economists to test the segmented market hypothesis
empirically. Several studies have been published investigating not only wage differen-
tials but also labour mobility between sectors (Maloney, 1999; Maloney, 2004; Bosch &
Maloney, 2007; Bosch & Maloney, 2008). They note that informal employment is a de-
sirable choice and see the informal sector as a result of competitive markets where in-
dividuals choose the informal sector voluntarily because of more flexibility and
avoidance of tax payments (Marcouiller et al. 1997; Maloney, 1999). For Mexico, the
segmented market hypothesis is commonly rejected. Hanson (2010) and Arias et al.
(2010), for instance, state that the informal sector in Mexico’s cities has increased,
partly due to perverse registration incentives induced by social insurance regulations
(Levy, 2008). Furthermore, informal employment can be potentially seen as an obstacle
to economic development, as productivity tends to be relatively low in informal firms
(Hsieh & Klenow, 2009).
Another study on wage differentials between informal and formal sectors in Mexico
was conducted by Gong & van Soest (2002) using the 1992/1993 waves of the ENEU,
restricting their sample to workers in Mexico’s five major cities. In line with Maloney
(1999) for example they find wage differentials for high-educated workers but not for
low-educated workers. This implies that formal sector jobs are rather inaccessible for
low-educated workers in Mexico’s urban areas. However, instead of simply queuing for a
formal job, individuals earn wages and accumulate human capital in the informal sector.
Finally, Meng (2001) provides one of the few studies which distinguish formal and in-
formal labour and investigate rural–urban migration in the same context. For China,
she finds that urban work experience raises the probability of becoming a formal
worker and that wage differences are mainly explained by observable components of
human capital endowment.
One complication of this literature is the existence of different definitions of informal
employment, which confound direct comparison of results. Generally, the most com-
monly used definitions can be classified into two groups. First, the legal definition is
based on the contribution to the social security system (e.g. Tannuri-Pianto & Pianto,
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tribute to the social security system and thereby do not benefit from social security reg-
ulations such as health care and pension schemes. Another legal definition is based on
the formality of the workers’ contracts. Here, informal workers are those who do not
have a written contract and, consequently, have significantly reduced or non-existent
labour law protection. The other group of definitions is based on productivity grounds.
Accordingly, the informal sector consists of workers in firms with five or fewer em-
ployees based on the argument that small firms tend neither to register their business,
nor their employees (e.g. Maloney, 1999; Gong & van Soest, 2002). The problem with
firm size as a measure is that larger firms tend to pay higher wages and are at risk of
being caught defaulting on registering as their number of employees increases. Hence,
they are more likely to register (El Badaoui et al. 2008). In this study, the most unam-
biguous legal definition is used which corresponds to registration with the social secur-
ity system.
To our best knowledge, all existing studies for Mexico are based on either rural or
urban household surveys or solely on migrants. Using the comprehensive and nation-
ally representative Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) allows us to combine all these
dimensions and therefore investigate wage differentials between rural and urban
workers whilst disaggregating by formal/informal sector.3. Estimation methods
We seek to analyse the returns to human capital endowments such as education, work
experience and ability for rural and urban workers to find out which endowments are
the driving forces of rural-to-urban migration. We start by estimating a Mincer (1974)
type wage regressions in which we control for sample selection from selection into sal-
aried employment, as suggested in Heckman (1979). We exclude the self-employed
from the analysis since their income is determined differently than wages of employees
(Hamilton, 2000).
In the first step, a Probit model is estimated to determine the probability of individual
i having salaried employment (ai = 1), which we denote w (working) as opposed to not
working or working without salary (ai = 0), which we denote nw (not working). This
can be written as
Pr αi ¼ 1jZið Þ≡ Zi þ ui; ð1Þ
where Zi are observed characteristics of the individual, such as human capital, person-
ality and family indicators, γ is the vector of coefficients of these variables and ui is the
error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and unity vari-
ance. We define two variables to represent the number of elderly and the number of in-
fants in the household, respectively, as exclusion restrictions in the model which
account for potential bias from selection into salaried employment. The number of in-
fants in the household impacts overall in a strong manner in reducing employment
probability significantly. If family planning in Mexico, a Catholic country, is driven by
non-fully planned fertility, then the number of infants would be a useful exclusion
restriction.
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nwf g is
included in the second step wage regression in the standard manner:
lnyi ¼ αi þ βXi þ δλ w
nwf g þ i; ð2Þ
where ln yi is the log hourly wage of individual i, β is a vector of coefficients of observ-
able personal and household characteristics Xi, and ϵi is the error term which is as-
sumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2. The wage yi is
observed if and only if ai > 0. Since we do not find evidence for selection bias, we esti-
mate the subsequent regressions with OLS which will serve as our baseline results.
We continue with estimating separate regressions for rural and urban employees.
Here, we take into account another type of selection bias which may arise from the
dual formal-informal nature of the Mexican labour market. Whilst formal employment
is not available for everyone, some workers, whose employers allow or encourage them
to register, have the choice, but do not comply. Hence, latent characteristics which may
be related to personality or to workplace characteristics may determine whether an in-
dividual selects into the formal or informal sector.4
Hence, we run regressions in which we control for selection into formal (f ) as op-
posed to informal (inf ) employment in a similar vein as described above for rural (R)
areas:
lnyRi ¼ αRi þ βRXRi þ δRλR f
inff g þ 
R
i ; ð3Þ
and urban areas (U):
lnyUi ¼ αUi þ βUXUi þ δUλU f
inff g þ 
U
i : ð4Þ
As exclusion restrictions serve the individual’s risk attitude, calculated from a set of
questions described in the next section, and whether the individual is honest, i.e. disap-
proving of the statement “Laws are there to be broken”. From these estimations we will
identify the extent to which the returns to human capital endowments differ between
rural and urban workers.
Subsequently, we examine whether the differences in returns to human capital en-
dowments can solely explain the rural–urban wage gap. If this were the case, we can
conclude that wage differentials are due to the difference in workers’ characteristics,
not firms’ characteristics, and derive implications for policy to address rural-to-urban
migration.
We implement a standard Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition (Blinder, 1973;


















In which β^U and β^R are recovered from the separate wage equations of the rural and
urban samples and β^ is a vector of coefficients from a pooled model over both samples
including a dummy variable identifying the populations. The left hand side of eq. 5 is
the raw wage gap, the right hand side consists of the explained part (difference in char-
acteristics) and the unexplained part (differences in coefficients). To determine differ-
ences in returns to human capital endowment, the vector is weighted by the
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capital variables separately, we decompose the rural–urban wage differential in detail.
4. Data
We use the longitudinal Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS, or ENNVIH) consisting
of approximately 8,440 interviewed Mexican households and 35,000 individuals in
2002, 2005 and 2009. It is representative at the regional, urban–rural and state levels
and contains information on individuals, households and communities. The questions
cover a variety of topics such as labour market status, family characteristics, education,
household income, health and self-evaluations.5
This study uses only the 2005 cross-section (MxFLS-2) because earnings information
is inconsistent in 2002, in which about 20% of salaried workers have non-positive
wages. The reasons for this appear not to be due to idiosyncratic measurement error
but rather due to interviewer mistakes and the like. Finally, we do not use the last wave
(2009–2012) because the survey data was collected over a three year period due to
problems of tracking the panel individuals and would likely contain substantial meas-
urement error.6
The data is restricted to men and women aged 16–65 years, excluding self-
employed workers, full-time students and the seriously ill. The final sample con-
sists of almost 10,000 individuals of whom 40% live in rural areas, explicitly, in an
area with less than 2,500 inhabitants. The detailed distribution of the workforce is
displayed in Table 1.
Those “not working” include those not employed in the traditional sense as well as
those working but without pay. (The share of those working without pay is quite small,
at less than 5%. Robustness checks without those individuals do not change the results
considerably.) Those not working comprise 51% of the urban population and 64% of
the rural population. In rural areas 36% are salaried workers of whom 75% work infor-
mally. In urban areas 49% have salaried employment, of which 60% is informal.
Unfortunately, we cannot control for differences in costs of living between rural and
urban areas directly since consumer price indices (CPI) for Mexico are based on infor-
mation collected in urban areas. Other recent papers are also faced with this CPI data
limitation (Fernandez-Huertas Mortaga, 2013) and appear to focus on quarterly time-
variation in prices between 2000 and 2004. Also, there was no information in the data
set which could have been used as an alternative to the CPI for measuring costs of
living. However, we include indices of health, education and income levels at the muni-
cipality level which are used to calculate the Human Development Index or HDI
(UNDP, 2008). In a single cross-section and in addition to state indicators, theseTable 1 Distribution of individuals by sectors
Urban Rural
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Not working 0.52 (0.50) 0.64 (0.48)
Informal salaried 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45)
Formal salaried 0.20 (0.40) 0.08 (0.27)
N 5623 3825
Authors’ calculations based on MxFLS-2
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tural economic differences between the regions.
The legal definition of the informal sector implemented here is based on the nature
of the contract an employee has with his employer. The person is considered a formal
worker, if the employee registered with the social security institute (IMSS) or is a gov-
ernment worker (ISSSTE7), and an informal worker otherwise.8 This legal definition is
also used by, e.g., Bosch & Maloney (2007) and Bargain & Kwenda (2009), and usually
considered as being more precise than definitions based on, for example, firm size. Reg-
istered workers are eligible to social security benefits which include health insurance,
pension, child care, housing loans, life and work-risk insurance and access to sports
and cultural facilities. Moreover, formal employees are legally protected by firing regu-
lations and severance pay.
Our key dependent variable is log hourly wage which is constructed by dividing re-
ported average monthly earnings by 4.33 and the reported average hours worked per
week. Individuals who failed to report positive wages (about 2%) and the top and bot-
tom percentiles of the wage distribution were dropped from the sample.
The main independent variables are experience, education and cognitive ability. Ex-
perience is modelled as Mincerian potential experience (age minus years of schooling
minus 6) because the full employment history is not available in the data. The individ-
uals are divided into two education groups, i.e. education up to compulsory level (0–9
years of schooling) or more, including high school and university graduates. A special
feature of the MxFLS is that a Raven’s test which measures an individual’s cognitive
ability was carried out with almost every interviewee.9 In the economic literature that
deals with returns to education, it is argued that an individual’s educational
achievement is influenced by his or her intelligence or ability and the exclusion of
a measure of intelligence would lead to endogeneity bias in wage regressions (Card,
1999; Psacharopoulos, 1994). The inclusion of the test score should, therefore, lower
the pure education estimates.
The included individual characteristics are age, marital status, subjective health, dum-
mies for being the household head and belonging to an indigenous group. Finally, in-
cluded family characteristics are household size, number of elderly and infants in the
household and being a farm owner.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of these variables. It can be seen that the aver-
age years of work experience are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. This pat-
tern is very similar in the formal and the informal sector with about 22–24 years in
rural and about 20–21 years in urban areas. It appears that the differences in years of
experience are driven by differences in years of education and are not due to age dif-
ferences, as the age profiles do not differ largely between rural and urban residents.
Years of work experience are highly correlated with age because we use “potential
experience”. After discussing the main results, we will also discuss some robust-
ness checks which show that the results for returns to experience differ from
those for age.
Notably, the share of high-educated workers is very different between sectors. The
largest share of high-educated workers is in the urban formal sector with 43% of all
workers. In the urban informal sector, 32% are university educated, 28% in the formal
rural sector and only 10% of the informal workers in rural areas have attended high
Table 2 Descriptive statistics by sector and locality
Informal Formal
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Hourly wage 23.40 22.01 17.12 17.81 29.98 25.03 24.07 20.85
Female 0.37 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45
Married 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.50
Indigenous 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.25 0.11 0.31
HH head 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50
High education 0.28 0.45 0.10 0.31 0.43 0.50 0.32 0.47
Age 16–25 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
Age 26–35 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Age 36–45 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44
Age >46 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.42
Experience 21.04 13.26 23.75 13.97 20.37 11.36 21.95 12.63
Hours/year 2101.37 958.78 1976.26 991.16 2283.89 801.48 2193.66 921.60
Raven test 0.55 0.23 0.49 0.24 0.59 0.23 0.54 0.24
Honest 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.83 0.37 0.82 0.39
Risky 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.41 0.49
Health 2.70 0.64 2.66 0.63 2.80 0.63 2.71 0.70
HH size 9.96 4.56 10.65 4.94 9.39 4.18 9.92 3.97
Nr. of infants 0.38 0.65 0.40 0.65 0.30 0.57 0.38 0.66
Nr. of elderly 0.35 0.89 0.40 0.91 0.32 0.86 0.46 1.04
Farm 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.17 0.22 0.42
HDI health 0.91 0.05 0.84 0.06 0.92 0.04 0.85 0.07
HDI education 0.85 0.04 0.80 0.06 0.86 0.03 0.82 0.06
HDI income 0.75 0.07 0.66 0.09 0.77 0.06 0.69 0.08
N 1594 1077 1129 298
Authors’ calculations based on MxFLS-2. Numbers are mean values and standard deviations
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in the Raven’s test score. These observations suggest the existence of self-selection into
formal employment in rural and urban areas based on components of human capital
endowment. Also, differences between rural and urban workers exist with regard to
personality traits such as risk attitudes and honesty.
5. Results
5.1. All workers
Table 3 shows the OLS results of the wage regression for the whole sample. In column
1, we identify a significant urban wage premium of 10%.10 This finding is entirely con-
sistent with Glaeser & Maré (2001) using U.S. data. The wage regression for all salaried
workers in the sample is extended by interaction terms of the human capital variables
with the urban residence dummy. Only the work experience interaction coefficients are
significant and suggest that experience is more highly rewarded in urban areas than in
rural areas. These findings are further supported by the separate wage equations for
rural and urban workers (columns 3 and 4). While the return to one additional year of
Table 3 Wage regressions for all, rural and urban workers
All All Rural Urban
Urban 0.104*** −0.064 – –
(0.026) (0.086)
Exp × Urban – 0.013** – –
(0.006)
Exp2 × Urban – −0.000* – –
(0.000)
High edu. × Urban – −0.009 – –
(0.053)
Raven × Urban – 0.028 – –
(0.086)
Experience 0.018*** 0.009* 0.006 0.022***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Experience2 −0.000*** −0.000** −0.000* −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High education 0.231*** 0.242*** 0.165** 0.239***
(0.027) (0.051) (0.064) (0.030)
Raven test 0.141*** 0.120* 0.119* 0.159***
(0.042) (0.068) (0.069) (0.053)
Formal 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.105***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.044) (0.024)
Other characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4099 4099 1376 2723
R2 0.405 0.406 0.387 0.388
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 15 state
dummies, 23 industry dummies and 18 occupation dummies included
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rural areas. We claim that higher rewards for work experience in urban areas may play
a role in the decision to stay in an urban area given one currently lives there, or to mi-
grate to a city given one currently lives in the countryside. To identify the role that ex-
perience has in explaining the wage differential, we carry out a detailed decomposition
analysis. Before we describe those results, we will discuss the findings of the formal/in-
formal sector wage analyses.5.2. Formal vs. Informal workers
As mentioned in the literature section, several authors have found wage differentials
between formal and informal workers. We show that this differential also exists when
distinguishing between rural and urban workers.
Table 3, columns 3 and 4 show that the formal sector differential exists in both
the rural areas (14%) and in the cities (10%). This is new evidence for Mexico, as
Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:21 Page 12 of 25earlier studies on the formal wage gap in Mexico were based solely on the
National Urban Employment Survey which did not even cover rural households
until recently.
The results of the separate wage equations for formal and informal sector
workers support what we have found based on the wage regressions for all
workers, but suggest quantitative differences between the sectors (Appendix:
Tables 7 and 8). Among the regression results for informal workers we can see
that a significant urban wage premium exists. Separating the sample into rural and
urban workers further supports the hypothesis that human capital is differently
rewarded in both regions. We find a high, significant return to high education of
about 17% in rural and 19% in urban areas (Appendix: Table 7, columns 5 and 7).
For informal workers there is no return to cognitive ability, as the Raven test coef-
ficient is not significantly different from zero. For informal workers in urban areas
the return to experience is 1.5% higher than for informal rural workers (column 3).
No other human capital related factors are significantly differently rewarded in
urban than in rural areas. Figure 3 shows the return to experience graphically for
informal workers and Fig. 4 for formal workers. Note that the returns to experi-
ence are insignificant for rural workers in the informal sector (Appendix: Table 7,
columns 5 and 6) while in the formal sector no significant difference in returns to
experience can be found between rural and urban workers (Appendix: Table 8,
columns 5–8). Furthermore, for formal workers, the results suggest that human
capital endowments other than education are not productive in rural areas as the
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. We will decompose the wage
differential in the next section to uncover the role the different indicators of hu-
man capital play in the determination of rural–urban wage differentials.
In essence, the results suggest that experience is simply not rewarded in rural, only in
urban areas, which can only increase the incentive to migrate to urban areas. As a con-
sequence, we expect the informal sector will increase in urban areas, assuming that thisFig. 3 Returns to Experience in the Informal Sector
Fig. 4 Returns to Experience in the Formal Sector
Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:21 Page 13 of 25additional labour supply is not met by equally rising labour demand in the formal sec-
tor (the classic problem of large cities in developing countries).5.3. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition techniques, we can identify whether the rural–
urban wage differential is driven by observable differences in human capital endow-
ments between rural and urban workers. Appendix: Table 6 indicates that the overall
difference between urban and rural wages is 32% for informal workers and 23% for
formal workers.
About one third of the differential in both the informal and the formal sector can be
explained by observable characteristics. The detailed decomposition results are dis-
played in Table 4 which focuses on education, experience and individual cognitive abil-
ity. The results for informal workers show that differences in experience, education and
cognitive ability largely explain the wage gap. By looking at the unexplained part, differ-
ences in coefficients of work experience account for the largest share of the unex-
plained part; the quadratic coefficients are 0.389 and −0.185 respectively and are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Returns to education and cognitive ability do not
play a role in the unexplained part of the rural–urban wage differential, nor do the
returns to other characteristics. Hence, there are significant differences in returns to ex-
perience, even after controlling for cognitive ability, other observable characteristics
and self-selection.
In the formal sector, this difference in coefficients (unexplained part) exists neither
for experience nor for any other variable. Solely the differences in the average of the
components of human capital endowment (education, experience and cognitive ability)
explain the wage gap in the formal sector. This finding supports the hypothesis that
urban firms are more human capital intensive and that they reward work experience
higher relative to rural firms.
Table 4 Wage decomposition by formal/informal sector





High education 0.032*** 0.003
(0.007) (0.013)










High education 0.036*** 0.037
(0.010) (0.034)





Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. OLS ordinary
least squares. The decomposition is formulated from the viewpoint of the rural population. For the underlying
regressions see wage regression tables. Other includes 15 state dummies, work, individual and household characteristics
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We conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that inconsistencies in the data set
do not drive our results and that we did not oversee important differences between
groups or selection processes. Therefore, we apply a Multinomial logit model in the
first step in which the labour market choices are formal salaried employment, informal
salaried employment and not working. The calculated inverse Mill’s ratios from this
model are included in the main wage equation. We neither find qualitative nor signifi-
cant quantitative changes in the main results.11
Another potential pitfall concerns the definition of the education variable. There-
fore, all regressions are estimated including a different education variable, which is
equal to one if the individual has attained university and equal to zero if educa-
tional attainment was up to only high school level. In all regressions, the education
coefficient was larger and still significant, but did not change the results
qualitatively.
One drawback of the dataset is that we cannot measure actual work experience
as we do not have a sufficiently detailed job history. As work experience is mea-
sured by age minus years of education minus 6, the correlation between our work
Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:21 Page 15 of 25experience variable and age is high (about 97%). To address the concern that we
are not actually measuring the returns to potential work experience but the
returns to age, we estimated all regressions including age instead of experience.
The coefficients are larger for age than for experience and there are no significant
differences between rural and urban workers. Hence, we conclude that our experi-
ence variable is actually measuring the effect of work experience and not simply
the returns to age.
Moreover, all wage equations were estimated (a) including a cubic term of ex-
perience and (b) with experience as a linear term. For some groups of workers, the
coefficients were also significant, but the findings do not differ qualitatively from
the results outlined above.5.5. Migrants’ labour market performance
In a supplemental analysis, we investigate the labour market performance in terms of
wages of rural-to-urban migrants to see whether it is in fact profitable for a rural
worker to migrate to a city, given s/he could find employment in both rural and urban
areas. Therefore we introduce a dummy variable which is equal to one if the individual
has lived in a rural area at the age of 12 and lives in an urban area at the time of inter-
view and zero otherwise with the aim of proxying the migration status of an individual.
We add this variable to the regressors in the main wage regressions as well as in the
first-step selection equation. In the following, we will only discuss the results for the in-
formal and formal sector separately as we again find noteworthy differences between
sectors concerning rural-to-urban migrants’ labour market performance.
Our main interest lies in the analysis of rural-to-urban migrants’ reward for human
capital in the urban areas compared to all other individuals in urban areas, including
urban-urban migrants and non-migrants. Hence, including the migrant variable in the
wage regression will show whether migrants experience an earnings penalty or earnings
premium and whether this differs by components of human capital endowment. We
find a wage gap for migrants compared to non-migrants in the informal sector but not
in the formal sector (see columns 1 and 3 in Table 5).12 Interacting the rural-to-urban
migrant dummy with the components of human capital endowment (columns 2 and 4)
reveals some important information on how different rural-to-urban migrants profit
from migration and whether migrating is reasonable in terms of wages. On the one
hand, rural-to-urban migrants who have obtained a university degree enjoy an average
wage premium of 14.7% compared to other high-educated workers. This coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5% level (one tailed test), even when controlling explicitly
for cognitive ability. Interestingly, rural-to-urban migrants do not have different returns
to experience than other urban workers. The coefficient is almost zero and insignifi-
cant. In the formal sector we cannot find wage gaps between rural-to-urban migrants
and other urban workers.
From this we conclude that the high returns to experience found in the previous sec-
tions are indeed a pull factor into urban informal labour markets away from poor earn-
ings prospects in rural areas. Evidence on whether this has positive or negative effects
on the rural population is mixed. While Boucher et al. (2005) find that internal migra-
tion increases the schooling level of the rural population through high-skill family
Table 5 Rural-to-urban migrants’ labour market performance
Informal Formal
Migrant −0.081** −0.195 −0.019 −0.183
(0.035) (0.135) (0.036) (0.162)
Migrant × Exp. – −0.002 – 0.004
(0.009) (0.011)
Migrant × Exp2 – 0.000 – −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Migrant × High Educ. – 0.147* – 0.077
(0.083) (0.076)
Migrant × Raven score – 0.170 – 0.075
(0.144) (0.157)
Experience 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Experience2 −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High education 0.189*** 0.149*** 0.306*** 0.284***
(0.045) (0.052) (0.041) (0.047)
Raven test 0.104 0.016 0.278*** 0.250**
(0.073) (0.101) (0.078) (0.099)
Hours/year −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.025 0.022
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Indigenous −0.058 −0.053 0.008 0.008
(0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071)
Female −0.160*** −0.160*** −0.068 −0.070
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
HH head 0.007 0.013 0.057 0.055
(0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047)
HH size −0.004 −0.004 −0.010** −0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 3.318*** 3.372*** 3.796*** 3.860***
(0.170) (0.178) (0.164) (0.174)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1594 1594 1129 1129
R2 0.307 0.310 0.480 0.481
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:21 Page 16 of 25migration networks, McKenzie & Rapoport (2011) find that (U.S.) migration leads to
lower educational attendance and attainment in rural migrant households. Conversely,
the literature shows that remittances from international migrants serve as insurance
against income shocks (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006). However, the latter two arti-
cles focus on international migration and are not necessarily applicable to internal
Michaelsen and Haisken-DeNew IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:21 Page 17 of 25migration. Generally, the investigation of consequences of internal migration for the
rural Mexican population has not received much attention in the literature thus far, as
compared to Mexican external migration to the United States.
6. Discussion
The findings provide evidence that rural–urban wage differentials are prevalent in
Mexico and that differences exist in the decomposition of wages between formal and
informal workers. Observed differences in all human capital related factors explain a
large part of the rural–urban wage gap in the informal and formal sector. Additionally,
in the informal sector, returns to experience are much lower for rural than for urban
workers, even after controlling for a large number of observable characteristics. When
considering that only a small part of the formal sector resides in rural areas and wages
are significantly lower in rural areas, small returns to experience are definitely a push
factor out of the rural and into the urban labour market, seemingly preferably and pos-
sibly easier into the informal sector when the individual is endowed with at least some
years of experience. Furthermore, the results are entirely consistent with the macroeco-
nomic picture described in the introduction. If the observed wage pattern continues to
exist, low returns to experience will not only act as a push factor away from rural areas
and into cities but also serve as an impediment for return migration. The fact that
rural-to-urban migrants do not have lower returns to experience than other workers
supports this result. Furthermore, rural-to-urban migrants enjoy an average wage pre-
mium for high levels of education. This will have further consequences for the exist-
ence of the informal sector. Assuming that formal jobs do not materialize as quickly as
the rural population migrates and the social security protection system does not change
fundamentally, then the size of the informal sector and unemployment is likely further
to increase in the cities.
Although we are able to control for a large number of personal characteristics, it is
likely that unobserved person and firm characteristics explain at least parts of the wage
differential. As various authors have shown, firms in the cities are more productive
and, hence, pay higher wages (Glaeser & Maré, 2001; Gould, 2007). Thus, it seems
plausible that work experience is only rewarded in urban firms rather than in rural
firms, which is supported by our results. This will be an incentive for individuals to mi-
grate to the cities to accumulate human capital in the form of work experience and be
paid accordingly, completely consistent with Lucas (2004).
An explanation for low returns to experience in general could be high labour mo-
bility which is prevalent in urban Mexico (e.g. Maloney, 1999; Gong & van Soest,
2002; Xiaodong et al. 2004). Numerous and frequent job changes may impede a
worker’s accumulation of valuable work experience and be a signal of low productivity for
an employer. Although not testable with the data set at hand, it is likely that labour mobil-
ity is also high in rural Mexico. A combination of high labour mobility and low productiv-
ity in rural Mexico may be responsible for low returns to experience. However, it must be
stressed that we control explicitly for cognitive ability in the regressions.
The findings give direction for policy in many respects. First, there is a need for the
government to attract more firms in rural areas that value work experience or where
worthy experience can be obtained to create incentives for potential migrants to stay. A
few examples of foreign or international firms which settled in rural areas and provided
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exist. For instance, with the settling of a Volkswagen plant near Puebla in the 1960s, a
previously poor rural area was turned into a flourishing city by improving the infra-
structure and providing jobs for skilled and unskilled workers. Suppliers settled in a
nearby business park, offering more and diverse employment possibilities. Waldkirch
et al. (2009) provide evidence that an increase in foreign direct investment in Mexico is
associated with more employment, especially in exporting and manufacturing indus-
tries. Furthermore, the presence of large inter- or multinational firms from developed
countries helps to improve or at least maintain the health and safety standards, the ad-
herence of human and labour rights and a relatively high wage level. Cabral et al.
(2010) provide evidence for the latter in Mexico. Generally though, there seems to be a
tendency towards improvement of regional labour markets through the settlement of
particular large firms with an international background (Spar, 1998). An increased pos-
sibility for employees to be registered with IMSS goes hand in hand with the creation
of employment by the settlement of a large firm. Raw descriptive statistics show that
the average number of employees in a firm that employs an informal worker is 50,
while a formal worker has on average 119 co-workers.
The attraction of large firms with an international background is however insufficient in
itself to increase formal employment. As Levy (2008) explains, there are several incentives
not to register and simply continue to work informally. One is the high price for social se-
curity coverage which amounts to about 30% of a worker’s wage in the lowest three dec-
iles of the wage distribution. Furthermore, social security benefits have to be bought as a
bundle even if the worker does not want or need all components. Other incentives are the
various social protection benefits (health insurance, housing subsidies, pension schemes,
access to day care centers and life insurance) which can be bought independently and are
almost free for poor workers when they are not registered with IMSS. Importantly, non-
registration goes hand-in-hand with the avoidance of payroll taxes. These are reasons why
the Social Security Law is violated in a widespread manner, leading to a persisting large
share of informal employment.13 Hence, policies need to address the incentives to work
formally, for example by changing the social insurance schemes.
Furthermore, reducing high labour turnover may enable workers to specialise and in-
herently become more productive. Possible reasons are short legal periods of notice
and severance for workers who terminate their job by choice. The labour market
reforms currently discussed in Mexico should attend to these two points. Another pos-
sibility to add value to work experience would be certified on-the-job training. While
on-the-job training enhances a worker’s skills, it may also increase loyalty to the firm.
In the literature review by (Bartel, 2000), a strong tendency towards high employer
returns to investment in on-the-job training is shown. In Mexico, loyalty towards the
employing organisation is low (Miller et al. 2001). Instead, loyalty to one’s supervisor is
strong (Martinez & Woodruff, 2007), leading to a spiral of job mobility as a worker is
likely to terminate his job when his supervisor leaves the firm.
7. Conclusion
Using a nationally representative household survey, this study investigates the differ-
ences in returns to human capital endowments between the formal and informal sec-
tors in Mexico, and distinguishes, to our knowledge for the first time, between rural
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Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) it has been shown that a large urban wage pre-
mium exists in Mexico and that returns to experience are small in rural areas com-
pared to urban areas. Applying Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition techniques and
correcting for potential selection bias from sorting into the formal sector, i.e. registered
employment, this study demonstrates that in the informal sector the differences in
returns to components of human capital endowment, such as work experience, educa-
tion and cognitive ability, explain large parts of the rural–urban wage gap. Furthermore,
the unexplained part is solely driven by the difference in returns to work experience be-
tween rural and urban workers. Hence, the more work experience a worker has accu-
mulated, the higher is his monetary disadvantage to work in a rural area as compared
to an urban area. In the formal sector, only differences in education levels contribute to
the explanation of the wage gap and we find no differences in coefficients. Furthermore,
we find no difference in returns to experience for rural-to-urban migrants compared to
non-migrants and even a positive wage premium for migrants with high education,
supporting the results by Boucher et al. (2005).
The findings suggest that there is a large incentive for rural residents with some years
of work experience to migrate from rural to urban areas in Mexico where they receive
substantially higher rewards for work experience. We believe that, if the observed wage
pattern continues to exist, the low returns to experience in rural areas will not only act
as a push factor away from rural areas into large cities, but also serve as an impediment
for return migration. Return migration, as shown in the literature, can however lead to
increases in educational attainment (Boucher et al. 2005). Moreover, assuming that the
number of rural-to-urban migrants increases faster than formal jobs can materialise,
which seems realistic given the low incentives to register, unemployment, under-
employment or informal employment is likely to increase in the cities. This would lead
to further exacerbation of economic and social problems in these large cities and con-
tinuing lower than optimal economic growth.
Our study shows that it is important to separate the population into different groups,
especially distinguishing between rural and urban workers as their incentives and out-
comes differ largely, even independently of personal observable characteristics. To our
knowledge, this is the first study for Mexico to separate the Mexican workforce by for-
mal/informal status and urban/rural location and decomposes the wage gap with re-
gard to human capital endowments, thereby being able to identify the key explanatory
role of work experience.
The results provide policy immediate and implementable policy implications. In order
to counteract rural-to-urban migration, we suggest a regional development plan involv-
ing the strategic attraction of particular large, international firms and FDI to rural
areas. This brings investments in infrastructure, creates jobs and facilitates labour law
compliance. Furthermore, large firms tend to pay relatively high wages and are more
likely to register their workers with the IMSS, which in turn can reduce poverty and
welfare dependency. In such firms, workers can accumulate work experience and be-
come more productive for which they will then be paid accordingly. Another method
of counteracting rural-to-urban migration would be to reduce labour turnover which is
currently high because of informal work relationships which imply little provision of
on-the-job-training, high loyalty to the supervisor rather than the employing organisation,
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man capital (and the resulting loss of potential efficiency or productivity gains).
Low returns to experience are likely to be the result of this high labour turnover –
and need to be targeted.Endnotes
1The percentage of the population living below the national poverty line was 47% in
2005 and increased to 52.3% in 2012 (World Bank Data) http://data.worldbank.org/
country/mexico.
2The commonly used Mexican data is the National Urban Employment Survey
(ENEU), which has only recently been expanded to rural areas.
3See e.g. (Michaelsen 2012) for a discussion the levels of violence in the early 2000s
in Mexico and (Michaelsen & Salardi, 2014) for a study of the consequences of drug-
related violence in Mexico after 2005.
4See e.g. Magnac (1991) for evidence of self-selection into the informal sector.
5More information can be found at http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/.
6Furthermore, the data providers informed us that interviewees were less willing to
reply to sensitive questions, such as income variables. We believe that this issue is re-
lated to the increase in organized crime related violence, spreading throughout Mexico
since 2007. Moreover, these circumstances have let to new migration patterns (Rios,
2014), which would not be adequately modeled in this analysis.
7The ISSSTE is the social security institution for public sector workers and the armed
forces. As not all public workers are registered with ISSSTE, for instance public
workers in educational institutions and workers of the public electricity companies, it is
impossible to exclude all public workers and hence they comprise the group of formal
workers together with all workers who are registered with IMSS.
8As Maloney (1998) Bosch & Maloney (2008) and Levy (2008) point out, workers,
especially poor workers, are highly mobile between sectors and hence workers can
actually not be labelled as formal workers or informal workers per se. For simplicity we
use these terms here but actually, when referring to an informal (formal) worker, we
mean an individual whose current job at the time of data collection is in informal
(formal) employment.
9See Raven & Court (2003) for more information about the test.
10Since we do not find selection bias, we only discuss OLS regression results here.
The probit and Heckman regression results are available from the corresponding au-
thor on request.
11We do not further discuss this methodology here as we are aware of the violation
of the assumption of independent irrelevant alternatives in the Multinomial logit
model. The result tables of the robustness checks can be obtained on request by the
corresponding author.
12We also estimated several models controlling for potential selection bias in the mi-
grant coefficient. Since no model provided evidence of such selection bias, we report
the OLS results here only.
13See (Levy, 2008) for a detailed description of Social Programs in Mexico and
their outcomes.
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All Informal Formal
Urban 2.980*** 2.869*** 3.136***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Rural 2.629*** 2.551*** 2.911***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.041)
Difference 0.351*** 0.319*** 0.225***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.046)
Explained 0.245*** 0.220*** 0.074**
(0.023) (0.027) (0.035)
Unexplained 0.106*** 0.099*** 0.150***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.037)
N 4099 2671 1428
Standard errors in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance level of 5% and 1%, respectively. The decomposition is
formulated from the viewpoint of the rural population. For the underlying regressions see wage regression tables
Table 7 Wage regressions for informal sector workers








Urban 0.099*** 0.093*** −0.051 −0.048 – – – –
(0.032) (0.034) (0.103) (0.103)
Exp × Urban – – 0.015** 0.014** – – – –
(0.007) (0.007)
Exp2 × Urban – – −0.000** −0.000** – – – –
(0.000) (0.000)
High edu. ×Urban – – −0.035 −0.036 – – – –
(0.074) (0.073)
Raven × Urban – – −0.009 −0.009 – – – –
(0.105) (0.106)
Experience 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.020*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Experience2 −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000 −0.000* −0.000 −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High education 0.181*** 0.174*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.173** 0.150** 0.189*** 0.193***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.066) (0.066) (0.077) (0.076) (0.045) (0.045)
Raven test 0.106** 0.111** 0.109 0.113 0.093 0.101 0.106 0.110
(0.053) (0.054) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.071) (0.074)
Table 7 Wage regressions for informal sector workers (Continued)
Hours/year −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.098*** 0.025 0.098*** 0.035 0.053 0.002 0.107*** −0.007
(0.027) (0.062) (0.027) (0.062) (0.045) (0.072) (0.035) (0.098)
Indigenous −0.063 −0.073* −0.063 −0.072* −0.107** −0.115** −0.043 −0.060
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.054) (0.058) (0.075) (0.071)
Female −0.200*** −0.408** −0.201*** −0.381** −0.285*** −0.497* −0.160*** −0.401**
(0.038) (0.163) (0.038) (0.164) (0.065) (0.256) (0.048) (0.199)
HH head 0.023 0.086 0.023 0.077 0.065 0.124 0.006 0.089
(0.032) (0.058) (0.032) (0.058) (0.049) (0.085) (0.042) (0.079)
HH size −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.002 0.005 0.007 −0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
HDI health 0.123 −0.111 0.133 −0.069 −0.308 −0.516 0.350 −0.059
(0.461) (0.530) (0.461) (0.527) (0.643) (0.793) (0.844) (0.853)
HDI education −0.096 −0.148 −0.092 −0.138 −0.723 −0.735 1.271 0.742
(0.480) (0.494) (0.479) (0.491) (0.557) (0.575) (1.536) (1.420)
HDI income 1.453*** 1.725*** 1.462*** 1.698*** 2.278*** 2.579*** 0.162 0.634
(0.356) (0.425) (0.355) (0.424) (0.499) (0.640) (0.705) (0.804)
Constant 2.102*** 1.922*** 2.187*** 2.027*** 2.695*** 2.517*** 1.702** 1.782***
(0.333) (0.362) (0.338) (0.366) (0.448) (0.516) (0.733) (0.683)
Mills Lambda λ – 0.260 – 0.224 – 0.208 – 0.371
(0.199) (0.200) (0.244) (0.297)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2671 9446 2671 9446 1077 3824 1594 5622
R2 0.338 0.340 0.351 0.312
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. OLS
ordinary least squares, Heck: Heckman selection 2nd step. λ is the nonselection hazard variable generated from the
probit model. 15 state dummies, 23 industry dummies and 18 occupation dummies included
Table 8 Wage regressions for formal sector workers








Urban 0.130*** 0.141*** −0.003 0.007 – – – –
(0.044) (0.053) (0.179) (0.169)
Exp × Urban – – 0.000 −0.000 – – – –
(0.012) (0.010)
Exp2 × Urban – – 0.000 0.000 – – – –
(0.000) (0.000)
High edu × Urban – – 0.008 0.004 – – – –
(0.080) (0.080)
Raven × Urban – – 0.119 0.121 – – – –
(0.161) (0.158)
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Table 8 Wage regressions for formal sector workers (Continued)
Experience 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.024** 0.020* 0.018 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
Experience2 −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000* −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High education 0.301*** 0.324*** 0.297*** 0.314*** 0.224** 0.176 0.297*** 0.313***
(0.039) (0.068) (0.079) (0.098) (0.103) (0.236) (0.041) (0.062)
Raven test 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.143 0.147 0.116 0.098 0.266*** 0.276***
(0.069) (0.072) (0.141) (0.144) (0.153) (0.148) (0.078) (0.081)
Hrs/year −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.024 0.014 0.024 0.018 −0.052 −0.044 0.031 0.022
(0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.040) (0.071) (0.082) (0.036) (0.043)
Indigenous −0.022 −0.022 −0.019 −0.019 −0.164 −0.166 0.035 0.035
(0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.143) (0.110) (0.071) (0.069)
Female −0.048 −0.076 −0.045 −0.062 0.060 0.100 −0.069 −0.090
(0.039) (0.078) (0.039) (0.079) (0.081) (0.203) (0.044) (0.074)
Hh head 0.068* 0.083 0.072* 0.080 0.189** 0.174* 0.057 0.071
(0.040) (0.056) (0.040) (0.056) (0.085) (0.099) (0.047) (0.061)
Hh size −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 0.023*** 0.023*** −0.010** −0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
HDI health −0.648 −0.603 −0.635 −0.604 −0.187 −0.152 −1.145 −1.044
(0.635) (0.595) (0.638) (0.595) (1.044) (0.913) (0.877) (0.904)
HDI education −0.699 −0.663 −0.701 −0.675 −0.706 −0.691 1.045 1.239
(0.690) (0.748) (0.680) (0.753) (0.950) (0.952) (1.600) (1.657)
HDI income 1.316** 1.372** 1.311** 1.345** 1.204 1.041 1.227 1.161
(0.557) (0.544) (0.551) (0.543) (1.314) (1.239) (0.842) (0.842)
Direction of comp. −1.113*** −1.114** −1.140*** −1.140** – – – –
(0.182) (0.537) (0.183) (0.536)
Constant 3.695*** 3.482*** 3.798*** 3.663*** 2.811*** 3.030*** 2.941*** 2.662**
(0.481) (0.708) (0.505) (0.747) (0.762) (1.168) (0.855) (1.167)
Mills Lambda λ – 0.056 – 0.033 – −0.066 – 0.046
(0.138) (0.140) (0.293) (0.136)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1428 9446 1428 9446 299 3824 1129 5622
R2 0.484 0.486 0.597 0.485
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. OLS
ordinary least squares, HM Heckman selection 2nd step. λ is the nonselection hazard variable generated from the probit
model. 15 state dummies, 23 industry dummies and 18 occupation dummies included
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